Rosaria Davis Auguste Nee Noel v James Raymond Auguste

• Jurisdiction: Caribbean States
• Judge: Pariagsingh, J
• Judgment Date: 23 July 2025
• Judgment citation (vLex): [2025] ECSC J0723-2
• Docket Number: CLAIM NO.: SLUHMT2023/0104
• Court: Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court

Between:

Rosaria Davis Auguste nee Noel

Petitioner

and

James Raymond Auguste

Respondent

[2025] ECSC J0723-2

Before

the Honourable Mr. Justice Alvin S. Pariagsingh

CLAIM NO.: SLUHMT2023/0104

THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN SUPREME COURT

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

DIVORCE

Appearances:

Mr. Eghan Modeste for the Petitioner

Mr. Horace Fraser for the Respondent

Petitioner's Application for Ancillary Relief

Pariagsingh, J

1 — Before the Court is the Petitioner's application for ancillary relief filed on the 6 ^th August 2024. Having considered the parties' affidavits and the relevant deeds and hypothecs, together with the decision of Jonathan Lesfloris v Glenda Lesfloris 1, which outlines the proper legal approach to community property in Saint Lucia, these are the reasons for my decision.

2 The starting point is that the law recognises only two types of matrimonial regimes: community and separate property. There is no middle ground and no discretion for the

Court to vary the statutory entitlements under the Civil Code. Once a marriage ends, each spouse becomes entitled to one half of all community assets as of right. The task of the Court is to determine which assets fall into the community and make appropriate orders for division, transfer or sale in accordance with the Divorce Act and Civil Code

Assessment of the witnesses in cross examination:

3 Both parties gave evidence and were cross examined. The Court finds that the Respondent was the more honest, direct, and believable witness, and that the Petitioner's evidence of her financial position was inadequate. Overall, the Court believed the Respondent. I will now treat with each claim separately.

Maintenance Claim (Lump Sum or Periodic Payments):

4 The Petitioner sought a lump sum of EC$100,000.00, described vaguely as a sum “to help her restart her life”; a sum she came up with upon the “advice of her legal counsel”, without reference to need or income disclosure. She argued that her income was historically spent on the children and household, and that post-separation she was left with under $5,000.00 in savings. She cited Medar v Medar 2, where Belle J awarded the wife $1,000,000.00 or alternatively $2,500.00/month based on a decline in standard of living and her entitlement to a comfortable retirement.

5 The Respondent argued that the Petitioner failed to identify whether her claim was made under sections 22, 23 or 24 of the Divorce Act, which attract different considerations. More critically, she failed to set out her reasonable requirements, a mandatory requirement under Clara Munro v Clayton Munro 3 at paragraphs 31–34. Her vague estimate of expenses, lack of a financial statement, and failure to provide proof of need seriously undermined her credibility.

6 As in Handler-Ruiz v Haydon 4, the court is likely to find that the Petitioner's failure to disclose her financial circumstances is fatal to her maintenance claim.

7 The Medar case is distinguishable: Mrs. Medar was nearing retirement, had spent years contributing to the household, and her husband failed to disclose his financial position. Here, the Respondent gave full financial disclosure and was found credible. I accept the Respondent's position that his current income (EC$5,000.00/month) does not permit a lump sum payment. The Petitioner's inability to produce concrete evidence of her needs makes it impossible for the Court to assess maintenance.

8 The Petitioner's lump sum claim is therefore dismissed.

Ownership of the Anse La Raye Property (Parcel 0641B 323):

9 The Petitioner alleged the property was community property because it was acquired during the marriage and the deed of sale exhibited to her Affidavit in Support as “R.A.2”, did not state that it was purchased with separate funds. She submitted that the Respondent's claim that it was a gift was not supported by any affidavit from the alleged donor (Mr. Clery), and that the vendor was actually Geest Industries (Estates) Ltd, a corporate seller unlikely to make gifts.

10 The Respondent argued that the property was purchased with his separate funds or was a token sale amounting to a gift. He relied on Articles 1193 and 1198 of the Civil Code, and the principle in Alison Gail Joseph v Walter Albert Joseph 5, that the presumption of community property can be rebutted with sufficient evidence.

11 The Petitioner admitted under cross-examination that she did not know when the property was bought, made no contribution to its purchase, and could not identify it. Given my finding that the Respondent was more credible, his narrative of separate acquisition is accepted.

12 The absence of express declaration of separate funds in the deed is relevant (per Article 1198), but not determinative. In this case, I accept the evidence about the acquisition and intention as stated by the Respondent.

13 Accordingly, I find that Parcel 0641B 323 is the Respondent's separate property.

Republic Bank Loan for $113,000.00 (Instrument 4530/2012):

14 The Petitioner claimed the debt related to a credit card solely used by the Respondent and that she signed the mortgage under coercion. However, under cross-examination, the Petitioner admitted that by signing the documents, she acknowledged joint liability for the loan. The Petitioner also did not dispute the funds were used to develop the matrimonial property.

15 The Petitioner's...