Pedro Deray Ellis v The Director of Public Prosecutions

• Jurisdiction: Caribbean States
• Judge: Saunders,Wit,Rajnauth-Lee,Barrow,Jamadar,Mr Justice Barrow
• Judgment Date: 02 March 2020
• Court: Caribbean Court of Justice (Appellate Jurisdiction)
• Docket Number: CCJ Civil Appeal No. BBCV2019/001
• Date: 02 March 2020

IN THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE

Appellate Jurisdiction

Before

the Honourables

Mr Justice A Saunders, PCCJ

Mr Justice J Wit, JCCJ

Mme Justice M Rajnauth-Lee, JCCJ

Mr Justice D Barrow, JCCJ

Mr Justice P Jamadar, JCCJ

CCJ Civil Appeal No. BBCV2019/001

BB Civil Appeal No. 3 of 2017

Between

Pedro Deray Ellis a.k.a. Pedro Deroy Ellis

Appellant

and

The Director of Public Prosecutions

Respondent

Appearances

Mr Larry A C Smith QC, Mr Gregory Nicholls, Ms. Desiree S. Browne, Ms. Jamila Smith and Ms. Lisa-Ann Arthur for the Appellant

Ms. Olivia Davis and Mr Oliver Thomas for the Respondent

Academic appeal — refusal of bail — Appellant acquitted of charge — public importance

JUDGMENT SUMMARY

1 The Appellant in this matter was granted special leave to appeal against the refusal of bail. The appeal has now become academic because the Appellant has been tried and acquitted of murder (with the jury failing to reach a verdict on manslaughter) and has been released from detention.

2 At a case management hearing, Counsel for the Appellant conceded that the hearing of the appeal had become academic and none of the orders that were sought in the notice of appeal could now be granted. He urged, however, that there were significant points regarding bail and the treatment of bail applications, both by the prosecution and the courts, that required this court's intervention.

3 Having considered the submissions, the Court followed its dicta in Ya 'axche Conservation Trust v Wilber Sabido et al and reiterated the principle that courts do not adjudicate academic questions or make pronouncements on abstract or hypothetical questions of law where there is no dispute to be resolved, unless the matter raised some exceptional circumstance.

4 It was noted that at the time of granting leave, the Appellant was still in detention and this Court was cognisant of the delay in hearing the respective applications for bail, as well as the overall delay in the trial of the charge. The Court observed that delay may have been a reason for granting bail. However, the appeal did not involve a consideration of the right to bail generally or the principles upon which bail is granted but was solely premised on the lower's Court's application of these settled principles.

5 The Court also noted that the question whether there existed a right of appeal on a bail application was one of public importance; however, there was no appeal to the Court against the decision of the Court of Appeal on the matter. In the circumstances, the Court dismissed the appeal.

JUDGMENT of The Honourable Justice Saunders , President and the Honourable Justices Wit, Rajnauth-Lee, Barrow and Jamadar

Delivered by The Honourable Mr Justice Barrow on the 2 nd day of March 2020

1 The appeal in this case, against the refusal of bail, has now become academic because the appellant has been tried and acquitted of murder (with the jury failing to reach a verdict on manslaughter) and has been released from detention.

2 Counsel for the appellant urged that the matter be brought on for hearing notwithstanding that outcome. Having been granted a case management hearing, counsel fully accepted at the hearing that the appeal had become academic and none of the orders that were sought in the notice of appeal could now be granted. He urged, however, that there were significant points regarding bail and the treatment of bail applications, both by the prosecution and the courts, that cried out for pronouncement from this court.

3 The principle that courts do not adjudicate academic questions is a long settled one. The principle derives from the fact that, absent specific statutory intervention to the contrary, courts are created to decide disputes between parties and not to render advisory opinions. There are established exceptions to the rule. This Court's jurisprudence on the matter was stated by Anderson JCCJ in Ya'axche Conservation Trust v Wilber Sabido et al 1 who discussed both the rule that the Court decides “disputes between parties and does not pronounce on abstract or hypothetical questions of law where there is no dispute to be resolved” and the circumstances in which the Court would make an exception. In relation to the exception, after citing persuasive sources and decisions for making exceptions, His Honour stated:

[4] … For the reasons given … we agree that this Court should be cautious in the exercise of its discretion to entertain an academic appeal and should in principle only do so where the question is one of public law (as distinct from private law rights disputes between parties) and where there are good reasons in the public interest to hear such an appeal. We agree with Lord Slynn...