Panton v Robinson
| Jurisdiction | Caribbean States |
| Judge | Marnan, J,Judge,Gomes, C.J. |
| Judgment Date | 24 November 1961 |
| Court | Federal Supreme Court (West Indies) |
| Date | 24 November 1961 |
Federal Supreme Court
Gomes, F.C.J.; Lewis, F.J.; Marnan, F.J.
D. Thompson for the appellant;
R.C. Rattray for the respondent.
Administrative law - Natural justice — Magistrate with personal interest in case has jurisdiction to issue warrant but warrant voidable
The appellant is a merchant carrying on business in Grand Cayman, a nominated member of the Legislative Assembly of the territory of which the Island forms part and a prominent member of the local community. He appeals from a judgment of the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands, dismissing an action which he brought against the respondent, who was the Stipendiary Magistrate of the Cayman Islands at the time relevant to these proceedings. The only cause of action pleaded was that usually known as false imprisonment and the only deprivation of liberty alleged was the arrest of the appellant by police officers on July 8th, 1960 and his detention in custody for a period which cannot have exceeded one hour and probably did not exceed half an hour. The statement of claim also contained general allegations of loss, expense and damage but no evidence was tendered in support of those allegations.
The material facts are as follows: on the morning of July 8th, 1960, the respondent issued three warrants for the arrest of the appellant, based on three informations sworn by the Chief of Police, on Sherwood. The respondent himself drafted the informations, acting on information supplied to him by Mr. Sherwood, which as the trial judge found, he honesty believed to be true.
It is not suggested that the informations contained any misstatements of fact and the body of the warrants, to which I shall refer later, exactly followed the wording of the respective informations. Shortly after 10 a.m. on the same day, three policemen entered the appellant's store and executed the warrants by arresting him, having first accompanied him to a comparatively private part of the premises. The officers told the appellant that they had orders to take him to the respondent's court. They declined to let him walk there and led him across the road and into a jeep, which was then driven to the court-house. There is no evidence as to the distance travelled or as to whether the appellants pleaded not guilty to all four charges and the respondent then asked him whether he wished to proceed at once or whether he wanted time to get legal assistance. The appellant asked for an adjournment of two weeks but the respondent remanded him on bail for one week only, requiring tow sureties of a total of (400. He told the appellant to appear for trial on July 15th, and released him. There was no evidence as to the length of time between the appellant's arrest and his leaving the court but it was not suggested that it was of sufficient duration to be significant.
I shall refer to three further matters in connection with the episode when considering the question of malice but for the moment it is only necessary to add that the fourth warrant, which had no material effect on the appellant's arrest and detention, was signed by the respondent while he was on the bench upon the basis of another information sworn by Mr. Sherwood in a form corresponding to one of the respondent's earlier drafts. The explanation of this is that the fourth information referred to a matter which only came to Mr. Sherwood's notice after the appellant's arrest.
The appellant appeared in court, on remand, on July 15th, July 29th, August 12th, August 19th and finally on September 5th, when another magistrate was sitting. The prosecution offered no evidence and all four charges were dismissed. On the same day, the appellant filed his statement of claim, alleging that the respondent, in causing his arrest and detention, had acted without jurisdiction and maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause. The trial judge, having heard the evidence of the appellant and respondent, who were the only two witnesses, held that the respondent had acted within his jurisdiction and that the allegations of malice and lack of reasonable and probable cause seemed to be disposed of by what he described as “the evidence of the appellant's disgraceful conduct.”
I must now make brief reference to the conduct of the appellant to which the informations related. The only evidence as to these matters was that elicited from the appellant in cross-examination and I allude to them as it were in parenthesis, because in my view the evidence was not strictly relevant to the issues in the case. The respondent had no first-hand knowledge of the appellant's conduct and had no right to issue process otherwise than upon the basis of the informations sworn by Mr. Sherwood. It is, however, both necessary and convenient to notice at this stage the admissions made by the appellant and the forms in which the respondent drafted the four informations for Mr. Sherwood's signature by way of representing to the court, in this case himself, the offences said to have been committed by the appellant.
The appellant admitted that on June 3rd, 1960, he met Mr. Sherwood and queried the legality of the latter's action in preventing the departure from the Cayman Islands of a man charged with a felony. The relevant information and warrant charged the appellant with:
“Uttering to a police officer in the execution of his duty the following words: ‘You have exceeded your powers. You have no right to take the action you have done and you will have to resign,’ which tended to deter the said officer from his duty.”
The appellant also admitted that on July 7th he had put up a notice on a notice-board outside the court-house. There were two informations and warrants relating to that conduct, which accurately set out the terms of the notice. Of these, the first charged the appellant that he:
“Unlawfully did publish the following words: ‘I, Ormond Lauder Panton, like to think of Mr. ABCDEFG-HIJKLMNOPQURTUVWYXZ Robinson in terms of the following old proverb: “when monkeys are prone to their antic passes, The higher they climb, the more they expose their arses.”’ which tended to a breach of the peace.”
The second charged publication of the same words — ‘which tended to scandalize the Government by abusing one who is entrusted by it with the administration of justice.’ Thus each information charged publication of the same words but alleged different unlawful acts.
The appellant also admitted that on July 7th he had exhibited a similar notice in his shop window. This notice was apparently observed by the police when they went to arrest him on July 8th and led to a fourth information and warrant, signed while the respondent was on the bench, which charged publication of the same words, with the same allegation as to scandalizing the Government, as in the third information. The two notices and all four informations and warrants were put in evidence at trial.
On the hearing of the appeal, the appellant's first contention was that the respondent, in issuing the four warrants, had acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, by reason of the fact that he was an interested party, the interest suggested being that the notices clearly referred to and were abusive of him. Counsel conceded that the significance of such an interest must always be a matter of degree, depending on the facts of the case, but it can fairly be assumed, for the purposes of this case, that the respondent had such an interest as would have disqualified him from sitting at the trial of the charges preferred. Counsel submitted, however, that a personal disqualification, by reason of interest, deprives a magistrate of a jurisdiction given to him by law, in this instance the jurisdiction to issue warrants. Counsel was, however, unable to cite any authority in support of that proposition. If that were the law, some such authority should not be far to seek since there have been numerous cases dealing with disqualification by reason of interest. In my opinion that is not the law. In Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal (Proprietors) (3), where the personal interest of the Lord Chancellor himself was in question, it was held that an order made by a judge who is personally disqualified by reason of interest from adjudicating on the matter before him is voidable only and not void. Were the order in excess of jurisdiction it would be void ab initio. I therefore hold that, so far as the question of interest applies, the respondent acted within his...
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