Panton v Robinson

• Jurisdiction: Caribbean States
• Judge: (Gomes, C.J.F., Lewis and Marnan, F.JJ.)
• Judgment Date: 24 November 1961
• Court: Federal Supreme Court (West Indies)
• Date: 24 November 1961

Federal Supreme Court

(Gomes, C.J.F., Lewis and Marnan, F.JJ.)

PANTON

and

ROBINSON

D. Thompson for the appellant;

R.C. Rattray for the respondent.

Cases cited:

(1) Abrath v. North E. Ry. Co.ELR(1886), 11 App. Cas.247; [188690] All E.R. Rep. 179.

(2) Brown v. Hawkes, [1891] 2 Q.B. 718.

(3) Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal (Proprietors) (1852), 3 H.L. Cas.759; 10 E.R. 301, applied.

(4) OConnor v. Isaacs, [1956] 2 Q.B. 288; [1956] 2 All E.R. 417.

(5) Taaffe v. Dowries(1813), 3 Moo. P.C.C. 36; 13 E.R. 15.

Legislation construed:

Cayman Islands Government Law (Laws of Jamaica, 1953, cap. 425), s.6A, as added by the Cayman Islands Government (Amendment) Law (Law 51 of 1956), s.2: The relevant terms of this section are set out at page 37, line 31 page 38, line 2.

Justices of the Peace Jurisdiction Law (Laws of Jamaica, 1953, cap. 188), s.2; The relevant terms of this section are set out at page 36, lines 1416).

s.64: The relevant terms of this section are set out at page 36, lines 1719.

Police-arrest-issue of warrant-magistrate with personal interest in case has jurisdiction to issue warrant but warrant voidable as against natural justice

Tort-false imprisonment-elements of tort-plaintiff to prove defendant acted maliciously without reasonable cause-malice inferred from issue of warrant by defendant with personal interest when other justices available, summons sufficient, and plaintiff remanded on excessive bail for insufficient period to obtain legal representation-want of reasonable cause inferred from failure to disclose specific offence in warrant

The appellant brought an action against the respondent in the Grand Court for false imprisonment.

On the basis of the facts related to him by the Chief of Police, the respondent, in his capacity as Stipendiary Magistrate, drafted informations and issued warrants, charging the appellant with uttering words which tended to deter the Chief of Police from the execution of his duties and unlawfully publishing notices abusing the respondent which tended to scandalize the Government.

The appellant was arrested and taken immediately to the court-house where, following a delay of a few minutes, he was put before the respondent. The appellant pleaded not guilty and requested a two week adjournment to allow for the provision of legal assistance from Jamaica but the respondent remanded him on bail for one week only. The appellant appeared in court on remand five times before no evidence was offered and the charges were ultimately dismissed by another magistrate.

The appellant then brought the present proceedings for false imprisonment against the respondent in the Grand Court on the basis that he had acted in excess of his jurisdiction, maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause. The court (Hercules, Ag. J.) held that he had acted within his jurisdiction and the allegations of malice and lack of reasonableness and probable cause were disposed of by evidence of the appellants disgraceful conduct which constituted a criminal libel and a criminal contempt of court.

On appeal, the appellant submitted that (a) the respondent had acted without jurisdiction in issuing the warrants because he was disqualified by reason of his personal interest in the case; (b) malice should be

inferred from his decision to issue warrants rather than summonses since he admitted that there was no question of the appellants absconding; and (c) lack of reasonable and probable cause should be inferred from the respondents failure to disclose any specific offence in the informations, as required by the Justices of the Peace Jurisdiction Law (Jamaica, cap. 188), s.64.

The respondent submitted in reply that (a) his decision to issue the warrants was not void ab initio, merely voidable, by virtue of his personal interest in the case and it should not be avoided because he had acted in the interests of justice and not of himself; (b) although the appellant may have attended court on a summons, a warrant had been more appropriate in order to prevent a breach of the peace; (c) the informations related to the specific offences of criminal libel and criminal contempt of court; and (d) since the warrants might have been issued by the respondent acting as a Judge of the Grand Court under the Cayman Islands Government Law (Jamaica, cap. 425), s.6A, it must be presumed that he did so act and was therefore entitled to immunity from liability.

Held, allowing the appeal:

(1) Although the respondent had an undoubted personal interest which disqualified him from adjudicating upon the case, it did not deprive him of jurisdiction to issue the warrants and his decision to do so was not void ab initio. It was, however, voidable on the basis that it offended the rules of natural justice despite the trial judges finding that the respondent had subordinated his personal interests to those of the administration of the law (page 34, line 22 page 35, line 5; page 40, lines 430).

(2) The Grand Court had mistakenly concentrated on the appellants conduct in deciding that the respondent had not acted maliciously with lack of reasonable cause but this did not discharge the onus of proof which fell on the appellant. In the event, malice would be inferred from the respondents decisions (a) to issue warrants himself when numerous other justices could have done so and summonses should have been issued since it was extremely unlikely that the appellant would have absconded or committed the apprehended breach of the peace (of which in any case no evidence was given); and (b) to remand the appellant for one week only on excessive bail thereby making it difficult for him to obtain legal assistance from Jamaica. Lack of reasonable and probable cause would be inferred from the failure of the informations and warrants to comply with the Justices of the Peace Jurisdiction Law, s.64, by not disclosing any specific summary offences, since there was no question that they intended to refer to indictable offences of criminal libel and criminal contempt of court which required an attempt to obstruct the course of justice (page 35, line 14 page 37, line 8; page 39, line 9 page 40, line 3; page 40, line 31 page 41, line 17).

(3) The respondent expressly signed the warrants in his capacity as Stipendiary Magistrate and, consequently, he was not entitled to the immunity from liability available to him when acting ex officio as Judge of the Grand Court. Since the appellant had discharged the burden of proving that the respondent had acted maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause, he would be awarded damages for false imprisonment and the costs of both the trial and the appeal (page 35, lines 913; page 37, line 27 page 39, line 2).

MARNAN, F.J.: The appellant is a merchant carrying on business
30	in Grand Cayman, a nominated member of the Legislative Assem-
bly of the territory of which the Island forms part and a prominent
member of the local community. He appeals from a judgment of
the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands, dismissing an action
which he brought against the respondent, who was the Stipendi-
35	ary Magistrate of the Cayman Islands at the time relevant to these
proceedings. The only cause of action pleaded was that usually
known as false imprisonment and the only deprivation of liberty
alleged was the arrest of the appellant by police officers on July
8th, 1960 and his detention in custody for a period which cannot
40	have exceeded one hour and probably did not exceed half an hour.
The statement of claim also contained general allegations of loss,

expense and damage but no evidence was tendered in support of
those allegations.
The material facts are as follows: on the morning of July 8th,
1960, the respondent issued three warrants for the arrest of the
5	appellant, based on three informations sworn by the Chief of
Police, one Sherwood. The respondent himself drafted the infor-
mations, acting on information supplied to him by Mr. Sher-
wood, which as the trial judge found, he honestly believed to be
true.
10	It is not suggested that the informations contained any misstate-
ments of fact and the body of the warrants, to which I shall refer
later, exactly followed the wording of the respective informations.
Shortly after 10 a.m. on the same day, three policemen entered the
appellants store and executed the warrants by arresting him,
15	having first accompanied him to a comparatively private part of
the premises. The officers told the appellant that they had orders to
take him to the respondents court. They declined to let him walk
there and led him across the road and into a jeep, which was then
driven to the court-house. There is no evidence as to the distance
20	travelled or as to whether the appellants arrest aroused the
interest of any spectators. At the court-house, the appellant sat
in a back room for a few minutes and was then taken into court by
the police and put before the respondent. The three charges were
read and then a fourth warrant was formally executed and an
25	additional

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