Kayman Sankar Investments Ltd v Blairmont Rice Investments Inc.

JurisdictionCaribbean States
JudgeWit,Rajnauth-Lee,Jamadar,Mr Justice Jacob Wit,Mr Justice Wit, JCCJ
Judgment Date09 October 2020
CourtCaribbean Court of Justice
Docket NumberCCJ Appeal No GYCV2019/008
Date09 October 2020

[2020] CCJ 18 (AJ) GY

IN THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Before

The Honourables Mr Justice J Wit, JCCJ

Mme Justice M Rajnauth-Lee, JCCJ

Mr Justice P Jamadar, JCCJ

CCJ Appeal No GYCV2019/008

GY Civil Appeal No 27 of 2012

Between
Kayman Sankar Investments Limited
Kayman Sankar and Company Limited
Beni Sankar
Applicants
and
Blairmont Rice Investments Inc
Respondent
On Written Submissions

Mr Vidyanand Persaud SC, Ms Prabha Persaud-Kissoon and Ms Vidushi Persaud-McKinnon for the Applicants

Mr Sanjeev J Datadin, Ms Jamela Ali, Ms Anessa Chow and Mr Donavon Rangiah for the Respondent

Cases referred to

Barbados Turf Club v Melnyk [2011] CCJ 14 (AJ), (2011) 79 WIR 153; Narine v Persaud [2012] CCJ 8 (AJ); Roseal Services Limited v Challis, Clarke, and Reid [2012] CCJ 7 (AJ), (2012) 81 WIR 51; Barbados Rediffusion Service Limited v Mirchandani et al [2005] CCJ 1

Legislation referred to

Guyana – Caribbean Court of Justice Act, Cap 3:07

Other Sources referred to

Caribbean Court of Justice (Appellate Jurisdiction) Rules 2019

Appeal — Leave to appeal granted by the Court of Appeal — Applications for special leave — Whether leave should be granted (or Grounds on which special leave granted) — Fresh applications — No appeal from the Court of Appeal's decision to refuse or grant leave to appeal — Caribbean Court of Justice (Appellate Jurisdiction) Rules 2019, r 10.12 — Caribbean Court of Justice Act, Cap 3:07 (Guyana), s 8

The Court of Appeal granted leave to the Respondent to appeal to this Court pursuant to section 6(a) of the Caribbean Court of Justice Act. The Applicants subsequently sought special leave to appeal against that decision of the Court of Appeal to grant leave to appeal, on the ground that the Respondent was at the material time defunct, a mere name with no legal existence.

Later, the Respondent filed its Notice of Appeal and as a result, the Court has two related cases before it. The judgment of the Court was delivered by the Honourable Mr Justice Wit.

The Court restated that there can be no special leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal's refusal to grant leave to appeal. Rule 10.12 describes what to do in such a case: a fresh application for special leave to appeal the lower court's substantive decision must be filed as this is sufficient to allow the Court to correct any wrong. Even though the Rules are silent with respect to the question whether a party should be permitted to appeal against the decision of the lower court to grant leave to appeal, the principle remains the same. Allowing such an application would cause unnecessary procedural complication and delay. Special leave applications are characteristically, fresh applications. Their purpose is to permit this Court to do justice where the lower courts made a wrong decision. Special leave, however, must be necessary to achieve that goal. Where the court below has granted leave to a party and a notice of appeal has subsequently been filed in this Court, the entire matter is before this Court (including a possible argument that the Court should not entertain the appeal) and so, no special leave to deal with it is necessary. The special leave application can therefore not be used as pre-emptive strike, or as a tool to appeal against a lower court's decision to refuse or grant leave to appeal.

The Court held that the correct forum at which the Applicants must argue what they had argued in this case, is the substantive appeal. The special leave application was dismissed.

of

The Honourable Justices Wit,

Rajnauth-Lee and Jamadar

Delivered by The Honourable Mr Justice Jacob Wit

on the 9 th day of October 2020

Mr Justice Wit, JCCJ

JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE

1

Section 8 of the Caribbean Court of Justice Act, Chapter 3:07, prescribes that:

“Subject to section 7, an appeal shall lie to the Court with the special leave of the Court from any decision of the Court of Appeal from any civil or criminal matter.”

2

In principle, the words “any decision” cover not only substantive but also procedural decisions of the Court of Appeal, such as, it would seem, a decision to grant or refuse leave to appeal a judgment delivered by that court in a civil or criminal matter to this Court. The question, however, is whether granting special leave for that purpose would generally make any sense. As may be recalled, this Court already decided this question in the negative with respect to a refusal of the Court of Appeal to grant leave. We think that this should be equally the case with respect to a decision of that court to grant leave to appeal to us.

3

This case places this very issue squarely before this Court. In this context and at this stage, the facts of this case can be briefly stated. The Respondent agreed to purchase from the Applicants' lands located in Von Better, Berbice Guyana. Between the parties arose a dispute concerning irregular payments by the Respondent. This formed the subject matter of a plethora of litigation between them. On 30 July 2018, the Court of Appeal decided in favour of the Applicants (the “substantive decision”). The Respondent being dissatisfied with the decision sought leave to appeal to this Court, which on 16 January 2019, upon hearing both parties, was granted by the Court of Appeal pursuant to section 6(a) of the Caribbean Court of Justice Act (CCJ Act). Upon receipt of the certificate of compliance, on 17 April 2019, the Respondent filed its Notice of Appeal against the substantive decision of the Court of Appeal (“the substantive appeal”).

4

In the meantime, on 21 February 2019, the Applicants applied to this Court for special leave to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal to grant leave to appeal to this Court. This special leave application was made on the ground that the Respondent was at the material time defunct; a mere name with no legal existence, being struck off the companies register since 24 July 2010. The...

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