Insanally v R

JurisdictionCaribbean States
JudgeHallinan, C.J.
Judgment Date15 September 1960
CourtFederal Supreme Court (West Indies)
Date15 September 1960

Federal Supreme Court

Hallinan, C.J.;

Rennie, J.;

Marnan, J.

Insanally
and
R.

J. O. F. Haynes, Q.C., for the appellant.

E. A. Romao, Acting Senior Crown Counsel, for the Crown.

Practice and procedure - Appellant committed for trial, for one offence — Whether Attorney General could indict for other offences disclosed by depositions — Criminal Law (Procedure) Ordinance, Cap. 11, s. 113.

1

Hallinan, C.J., delivered the judgment of the court: In this case, the appellant was committed for trial by the magistrate for the offence of larceny by a public officer under s. 185 of the Criminal Law (Offences) Ordinance. The Attorney General indicted the appellant on four counts: forgery, uttering, larceny and falsification of accounts.

2

The only ground of appeal argued before us was that the Attorney-General had no power to indict the appellant for offences other than those upon which he was committed for trial. The powers of the Attorney General are contained in s. 113 of the Criminal Law (Procedure) Ordinance, Cap. 11, which provides as follows:

“On receipt of the documents relating to the preliminary inquiry, the Attorney-General, if he sees fit to do so, shall institute those criminal proceedings in the court against the accused person which to him seem legal and proper.”

3

Counsel for the appellant submitted that the discretion of the Attorney-General under that section was fettered by the tone of other provisions of the Ordinance and he has referred us to those sections which deal with the issue of summonses or warrants by the magistrate upon receiving a sworn information, and with the magistrate's power to commit an accused person for trial.

4

As we apprehend his argument, it amounts to this: that because the word “charge” is used in relation to the information and to the order of committal and in relation to the indictment, that the offence mentioned in the order of committal and in the indictment must be that contained in the information.

5

It would be absurd to restrict the offences charged in the indictment to those mentioned in the sworn information which is often the information of a layman and before any judicial inquiry has been made and the depositions taken. Counsel for the appellant concedes that...

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