Dominica, St Vincent, St Lucia and a New Federal Attempt

• Pages: 197-219

CHAPTER 11

In this chapter, we shall consider developments of constitutional significance which have

taken place in Dominica, St Lucia and St Vincent since the 1960s. In each of these

territories, which became independent between 1978 and 1979, there was civil commotion

of one kind or another shortly after independence. In Dominica, the civil unrest was

much more serious and sustained than in the other two territories; and, in addition,

external elements played a much larger role than in either of the other two. In St Lucia,

the political difficulties stemmed mainly from a leadership struggle within the governing

party, whereas in St Vincent the civil disorder took the form of a short-lived ‘mini-

rebellion’ which occurred in one of its dependencies. We shall now examine in turn the

problems which each territory experienced.

The final section of this chapter alludes to a little-known attempt towards the end of

the 20th century to establish a federal union comprising these three territories and

Grenada. It unfortunately came to naught for reasons which will appear.

DOMINICA

As far back as 1976, the Government of Dominica requested Britain to terminate the

status of associated statehood which had existed between the two countries since 1967.

The Premier, Patrick John, had first made public his intention to proceed to independence

at a convention of his party, the Dominica Labour Party (DLP), which was held in the

village of Salisbury in August 1976. This statement became known thereafter as the

‘Declaration of Salisbury’.

At that time the opposition Dominica Freedom Party (DFP) was of the view that the

provision of s 10(1) of the West Indies Act 19761should be invoked, by virtue of which a

referendum was required to determine whether the country should terminate its then

current political status. If two-thirds of the people voting in the referendum decided in

favour of terminating the association it would automatically have come to an end and

the State would thereupon proceed to independence. This view was rejected by the DLP

Government which asked Her Majesty’s Government to terminate the association under

s 10(2) of the Act, as Grenada had done in 1974 when it became independent, and as all

the former associated States have since done. Under that sub-section, Her Majesty was

empowered by Order in Council to terminate the association and to grant independence

to that State at the request of the State Government, signified by a resolution passed by its

legislature.

Following the promulgation of the Declaration of Salisbury, a Green Paper was

published by the Dominica Government. Thereafter, both parties held a series of public

meetings to explain the issues to the people and to prepare them for independence.

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DOMINICA, ST VINCENT, ST LUCIA

AND A NEW FEDERAL ATTEMPT

1 1967 C4 (UK).

In May 1977, a constitutional conference was held in London at which fundamental

differences between the Government and the Opposition became evident. The main

points of contention between the two parties were:

(a) whether Dominica should have a republican system of government with an elected

Executive President. This was the proposal put forward by the DFP, while the

Government wished to retain the Queen as the Head of State of Dominica, being

represented locally by a Governor General; and

(b) whether there should be a unicameral or bicameral legislature and the basis on which

persons would be appointed to that body.

On the question of the type of constitution (republican or monarchical), the DFP had

proposed that the country, upon attaining independence, should become a republic with

an executive President as Head of State. The President should be elected and should

himself preside over the national assembly. He should also have the power to delay for

one month, or until the next sitting of the House of Assembly, any Bill which affected

special interests which did not have the opportunity of making their views known. The

House of Assembly should, by a 75% vote of its members, have the power to annul any

decision of the President. With regard to elections to the proposed legislature, the DFP

wished to have a mixture of the two electoral systems, viz, first-past-the-post and

proportional representation: the suggestion being that 13 members should be elected to

the 21 member House by the first system and the remaining eight members should be

elected on the basis of proportional representation.2

At the conference it was not possible to reconcile these differences. However, the

conference chairman decided that, having regard to size of the Government majority in

the House of Assembly, he would proceed on the Government’s proposals which were

slightly modified as follows:

(a) the Queen would remain Head of State and be represented by a Governor General;

(b) parliament would be a unicameral body comprising 21 elected and nine nominated

members – and the electoral regime would be first-past-the-post.

The chairman, however, left the door open on these two issues, suggesting that the

Opposition should continue to canvass their point of view in Dominica in an effort to

persuade the House of Assembly when the matters came on for debate.3

It was further decided that at the end of the conference a paper would be prepared by

the Foreign and Commonwealth Office setting out the areas of agreement reached on the

terms of the Constitution. At the same time, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

would prepare a draft constitution in collaboration with the Attorney General of

Dominica for submission to Parliament.4The British Government, however, wished to be

satisfied that the move to independence commended itself to the majority of Dominicans.

The conference had anticipated that a further process of consultation between Her

Majesty’s Government and the Dominica Government might become necessary if the

Commonwealth Caribbean Constitutional Law

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2 See Report of the Dominica Constitutional Conference, 1977, Annex C, p 2.

3Ibid, para 9, p 4 and para 28, p 8.

4 Ibid, para 27, p 8.