Chapter 9. Liability for Animals

• Pages: 226-249

INTRODUCTION

Tortious liability for animals may be classi ed thus:

(a) liability for cattle trespass;

(b) liability for dangerous a nimals (the ‘sciente r act ion’);

(c) liability for dogs;

(d) liability in negligence.

In the Caribbean, the common law principles have been modied by statute in cer-

tain jurisdictions. For instance, the Animals (Civil Liability) Act 1980, Cap 194A

(Barbados) has codied much of the law relating to liability for animal s, using as its

model the Animals Act 1971 of England and Wales; and the Trespass Act, Cap 392 has

amended the law relating to cattle trespass in Jamaica. Also, legislation imposing

strict liability for harm by dogs has be en introduced in some jurisdictions.1

Apart from the main heads of liability for animals enumerated above, there

are several ways in which a person may incur tortious liability through the instru-

mentality of his animals. For instance, the keeper of pigs or goats may be liable in

private nuisance if the stench from the animals unreasonably interferes with his

neighbour’s enjoyment of his land;2 or he may be liable in public nuisance if his ani-

mals are allowed to obstruct the highway and thereby cause particular damage to

the claimant. And one who deliberately sets his dog upon a person wil l be as liable

for battery as if he had struck the person a blow with his st. It has even been sug-

gested that one who trains his par rot to defame someone may be liable for slander.3

LIABILITY FOR CATTLE TRESPASS

This, one of the most ancient causes of action known to the com mon law, lies where

cattle in the possession or control of the defendant are either intentionally driven

onto the claimant’s land or stray onto such land independently. The essence of the

tort has been expressed thus:

If I am the owner of an an imal in which, by law, the right of property can exist, I am

bound to take care th at it does not stray onto the land of my neighbour; and I am

liable for any trespass it may commit, and for t he ordinary consequences of that tr es-

pass; whether or not the escape of the an imal is due to my negligence is a ltogether

immaterial.4

1 E.g. Dogs Act, Cap 71:05, s3 (Guyana); Dogs (Liability for Injuries by) Act, s2 (Jam aica); Animal s

(Civil Liability) Act, Cap 194A, s8 (Barbados); Dogs (Injury to Persons, Cattle a nd Poultry) Act, Cap

238, s3 (British Virgin Isl ands).

2 Walwyn v Brookes (1993) High Court, St Kitts and Nevis, No 34 of 1992.

3 Wineld and Jolowicz, Tor t, 13th edn, 1989, London: Sweet & Maxwell, p 456.

4 Cox v Burbidge (1863) 143 ER 171, at 174, per Williams J.

CHAPTER 9

LIABILITY FOR ANIMALS

DOI: 10.4 324/97813510 65108-9

10.4324/97813 5106 5108 -9

Chapter 9: Liability for Animals 227

Chapter 9: Liability for Animals

Thus, the owner of cattle (which, at common law, includes not only cows and bulls,

but also horses, donkeys, sheep, pigs, goats and poultry)5 is strictly liable for all

damage done by such cattle when trespassing on the land of another.6 Damages are

recoverable not only for harm to the claimant’s land and crops caused by the tres-

pass, but also for injury to his animals7 and chattels8 and for any injuries inicted

upon the claimant himself.9 The principle is illustrated by East Coast Estates Ltd v

Singh.10 Here, cattle belonging to the defendant strayed onto the claimants’ land

and damaged ‘pangola grass’ which the claimants were cultivating. The defendant

alleged that, as he was driving his catt le along the road, rain began to fall and he was

forced to drive the cattle into a nearby common whence, through no fault on his part,

they strayed onto the claimants’ land. Crane J held that liability in cattle trespass is

strict, and the defendant was liable irrespective of any intention or negligence on his

part. He said:11

The cattle trespas s principle is a species of str ict liabilit y – one of the oldest grounds

of liability in Engl ish law … It is clear from hi s defence that Thaku r Singh is urgi ng

that he did not deliberately depasture h is cattle in area ‘J’ and that the trespas s is not

attributable to any wrongfu l act of his … On both principle and authority it seems to

me that this defence ca nnot be sustained, for the law is t hat a defendant is liable for any

damage done to another’s land by his strayi ng cattle … irrespective of any intention or

negligence on his part.

Assuming what Th akur Singh has st ated about rain putting h im in a dilemm a to

be the truth, he would, it seems, sti ll be liable to the [claima nts] for trespass by

animals e scaping, not from the roadway to area ‘J’, but from the eld where they

were driven by him.

There is no analog y, as counsel for t he rst defendant seems to thi nk, between the facts

of his client’s case and thos e in Goodwin v Chevele y.12 Counsel’s argument is that his

client acted reasonably by driv ing his cattle during the rai nstorm to the common from

which they escaped to are a ‘J’, before going in sea rch of the one which had es caped

into area ‘I’. Though I agree it might have been reasonable for the rst defendant to

have done so, the fact remains that t he trespassing cattle escaped, not di rectly from the

roadway to the [claimants’] ‘pangola pasture’, but thereto from the common where the

defendant had driven them – which fac t makes all the difference and s erves to distin-

guish thi s case from Goodwin’s, where the animals strayed into the defe ndant’s close

directly from t he roadway along which they were being driven; for it is a defence to an

action for cattle trespas s that the animals strayed from the roadway where they were

being driven, into an adjacent close.13

5 At common law, ‘cattle’ does not include dogs (Tallents v Bell [1944] 2 All ER 474) or cats (Buckle v

Holmes [1926] 2 KB 125).

6 In Barbados, liability for cattle trespas s is governed by s5 of the Animals (Civil L iability) Act, Cap

194A, which has preserved st rict liability.

7 Ellis v Loftus Iron Co (1874) LR 10 CP 10. See Carrington v Montrose Poultry Farms Ltd (1997) 33 Barb

LR 251 (High Court, Barbados).

8 Cooper v Rly Executive [1953] 1 All ER 477.

9 Wormald v Cole [1954] 1 All ER 683.

10 [1964] LRBG 202 (Supreme Court, British Guiana).

11 Ibid, at 204.

12 (1859) 28 LJ Ex 298.

13 Tillett v Ward (1882) 10 QBD 17. See p .........