Alex Tasker v The United States of America
| Jurisdiction | Caribbean States |
| Judge | Saunders P,Anderson,Rajnauth-Lee,Barrow,Burgess JJ |
| Judgment Date | 07 December 2023 |
| Court | Caribbean Court of Justice |
| Year | 2023 |
| Docket Number | CCJ Application No BB/A/CR2023/001 BB |
[2023] CCJ 14 (AJ) BB
Mr Justice Saunders, President
Mr Justice Anderson
Mme Justice Rajnauth-Lee
Mr Justice Barrow
Mr Justice Burgess
CCJ Application No BB/A/CR2023/001 BB
Criminal Appeal No 1 of 2021
IN THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF BARBADOS
Practice and Procedure — Appeal — Leave to appeal — Special leave — Application for special leave to appeal — Criteria for grant of special leave — Application for leave to appeal order of committal dismissed by Court of Appeal — Application to reopen proceedings — Whether Applicant given fair opportunity to be heard — Exceptional circumstances — Enlargement of statutory time limit — Right to fair trial — Extradition Act, Cap 189 — Magistrate's Court Act, Cap 116A.
After a hearing, the Applicant, Mr Alex Tasker, was committed by a Magistrate to surrender to authorities of the United States of America to face charges of money laundering and conspiracy to launder money. Immediately after the committal, Mr Tasker's attorney indicated orally his client's intention to appeal the Magistrate's order. In accordance with his duty under s 19 of the Extradition Act, the Magistrate informed Counsel of the need to seek leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal, or alternatively, seek a writ of habeas corpus within 15 days of committal as required by s 20 of the Extradition Act. Instead of heeding the Magistrate's advice, Mr Tasker's attorney purported to appeal the committal order by issuing a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeal pursuant to s 240 of the Magistrate's Courts Act. This was the wrong procedure, and by the time Mr Tasker's attorneys recognised their error, the 15-day time limit for seeking leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal had expired. Notwithstanding, a few days after the expiry of the time limit, the attorneys filed an application for leave to appeal in the proper form.
The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Tasker's application for leave to appeal on the ground that it was filed late. The Court also held that it had no power to embark on a consideration as to whether time should be extended, or alternatively whether the purported appeal filed under s 240 but within time should carry any weight.
Mr Tasker then sought special leave to this Court to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal. Upon consideration of the Notice of Application and the affidavit in support filed by Mr Tasker in accordance with r 10.14 of the Caribbean Court of Justice (Appellate Jurisdiction) Rules, 2021, and the affidavit in opposition filed by the Respondent, a three-judge panel (Saunders P, Wit and Anderson JJ concurring), refused the application for special leave. The Panel concluded that, on the papers presented, there was no arguable case advanced by Mr Tasker justifying the grant of special leave.
Dissatisfied with the manner in which his special leave application was addressed, Mr Tasker applied to the Court to review its decision, effectively applying to reopen the proceedings. The Court ordered the parties to file written submissions on (1) whether the application to reopen the application for special leave should be granted; (2) if granted, whether the decision to refuse special leave should be reversed and (3) if Mr Tasker succeeded on (1) and (2), whether the appeal of the Court of Appeal's decision should be allowed.
The matter was argued before a five-judge panel in Barbados. With respect to whether the application to reopen the proceedings should be granted, the Court had in the past interpreted r 10.14 as meaning that it was open to it to dismiss an application for special leave at any one of three stages. One stage was after the notice of application for special leave and the affidavit in opposition of the respondent are filed. The Court agreed with Mr Tasker's attorney, however, that, given the manner in which r 10.14 is drafted, a litigant is justified in being aggrieved if an application for special leave is dismissed on a consideration of the notice of application for special leave and the affidavit in opposition of the respondent only. Upon re-examining r 10.14, the Court accepted that litigants are justifiably entitled to believe that although they must state in their application for special leave all such facts in support of their application, the law grounding the application which they propose to argue will be elaborated upon either in another written document or orally before the Court, or both in writing and orally. The Court agreed that its decision denying special leave should be quashed and that, in the interests of justice, the application for special leave be reopened.
As to the application for special leave and, if successful, the appeal itself, the Court agreed with Mr Tasker's attorney that the Court of Appeal was in error in taking the view that it had no power to decide for itself whether to hear the application for leave to appeal. It was open to the Court of Appeal in all the circumstances to determine whether this was a case in which it should give effect to the right to a fair trial and facilitate access to justice. The authorities cited by Counsel demonstrated that strict compliance with time limits is subject to the right to a fair trial. In other words, the court does possess an exceptional jurisdiction to extend the statutory time limits in those circumstances where strict compliance would operate to deprive a litigant of his right to a fair trial or limit his right to access the appeal process. Thus, the Court was of the view that the Court of Appeal was in error in considering that it had no power or jurisdiction or discretion to exercise in all the circumstances.
The Court did not accede to the view that it should itself exercise the discretion vested in the Court of Appeal to treat the Notice of Appeal filed on 8 September 2021 as an application for leave brought within the statutory 15-day time limit in accordance with the Extradition Act or, alternatively, extend the time for filing of the application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. Instead, the case was remitted to the Court of Appeal to exercise its own discretion on these matters and to determine afresh how best to treat with Mr Tasker's clearly expressed desire to challenge the Magistrate's Order of committal.
Brown v Moore-Griffith (No 2) [2013] CCJ 12 (AJ) (BB), (2013) 84 WIR 76; Culmer v DPP BS 2020 CA 61 (CARILAW), (25 June 2020); Deane v Allamby [2016] CCJ 21 (AJ) (BB), (2016) 89 WIR 193; Narine v Natram [2018] CCJ 26 (AJ) (GY); Pomiechowski v District Court of Legnica, Poland [2012] 1 WLR 1604; Powell v Spence [2021] UKPC 5 (JM); R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [2000] 1 AC 119; R v Henry [2018] CCJ 21 (AJ) (BZ), (2018) 93 WIR 205; Sans Souci Ltd v VRL Services Ltd [2012] UKPC 6 (JM); Taylor v Lawrence [2003] QB 528; Watson v Fernandes [2007] CCJ 1 (AJ) (GY), GY 2007 CCJ 3 (CARILAW).
Barbados – Extradition Act, Cap 189, Magistrate's Courts Act, Cap 116A.
Caribbean Court of Justice (Appellate Jurisdiction) Rules 2021.
Mr Douglas L Mendes, SC with Mr Andrew OG Pilgrim, KC and Mr Clay Hackett for the Applicant
Mr Alliston G Seale, Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions and Mr Oliver JM Thomas, Senior State Counsel for the Respondent
Saunders P ( Anderson, Rajnauth-Lee, Barrow, Burgess JJ concurring)
The United States of America wishes to have the Applicant, Mr Alex Tasker, extradited to face money laundering and other charges in that country. On 8 September 2021, after a hearing, a Magistrate committed Mr Tasker to face those charges. Mr Tasker's attorney there and then indicated orally his determination to appeal against the Magistrate's order. The Magistrate advised, in accordance with s 19 of the Extradition Act, 1 that Mr Tasker needed to seek leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal or, alternatively, seek a writ of habeas corpus within 15 days of his committal.
The attorneys did neither. They instead, mistakenly but immediately (that is to say, on the same day as Mr Tasker's committal), purported to appeal the committal order by issuing a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeal in keeping with the process for appealing a Magistrate's order as set out in s 240 of the Magistrate's Courts Act 2. That was of course the wrong procedure and in defiance of the Magistrate's wise counsel. But, by the time the attorneys recognised their error, it was too late. Notwithstanding, a few days after the expiry of the 15-day time limit, they filed an application for leave to appeal the Magistrate's order in accordance with the Extradition Act.
The Court of Appeal ignored the Notice of Appeal filed in keeping with s 240 of the Magistrate's Courts Act and dismissed Mr Tasker's application for leave to appeal on the ground that it was filed late and that the Court had no power to embark on a
Mr Tasker applied to this Court on 11 May 2023 for special leave to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal but, in a judgment written by me, a three judge Panel of this Court denied the application for special leave. We did so upon consideration only of the Notice of Application and the affidavit in support filed by Mr Tasker and the affidavit in opposition filed by the Respondent.
Mr Tasker, aggrieved at the manner in which his application to this Court was addressed, filed an application for the Court to review its dismissal, effectively applying to this Court to reopen the proceedings. The Court ordered the parties to file written submissions on (1)...
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